SOVEREIGNTY, PERSONS AND THE NOAHIDE LAWS
1.The sovereignty of G-d
World society and the Noahide laws
The sources of modern international law are customary international law, based on practices which nations chose to observe; an International Court of Justice, to which nations elect to subscribe; a United Nations, the members of which stand in political relationships to one another, where also certain nations possess veto powers; and finally the contractual activity of nations in treaty-making. The common feature of all of these aspects of international law is that they are essentially voluntary; they represent elective commitments of sovereign nations, which are bound to no moral or legal authority above their individual sovereign existences, except to the extent that they chose to subscribe or be bound by one. That authority, at all events, is not absolute.
This is the character of modern international law, the law which was formulated and practised in modern times since the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It corresponds to the political reality of the rise of sovereign national entities. This law was historically preceded by a different political reality and different notions of law. In ancient and medieval times, before the emergence of sovereignty as a universal principle of states, there prevailed a notion of natural law. This was the concept of a concrete morality of universal application which governed states just as municipal or domestic law governs the individuals within a single state.
Typically, in its Roman law or medieval canon law expressions, this law was based on purportedly universal and immutable principles. The political reality corresponding to this natural law was that of the Roman empire – the pax Romana (the Roman peace) – and later, the political supremacy of the Catholic church in medieval Europe. A “natural”, universal morality was to arbitrate the laws of individual states. This was intended to be the law of all human beings and all states.
Roman and Catholic canon law historically lost their claims to be the universal law of humanity. There is a “new” candidate for a universal substantive law for all humanity. It is new only the sense, that contemporary conditions for the first time have allowed public discussion of it, though in fact it is the most ancient of codes of universal law. These are the seven laws which bound Noah the biblical survivor of the flood, and his descendants, humanity at large. Now, their authority comes from Sinai, where they were implied and reiterated in the Biblical, written text and expounded within the Oral law, both of which were given to Moses.
These are the laws which constitute the foundations, not only of domestic, but also international society. Thus war, where there are no legitimate grounds of self–defence, will also fall under the Noahide prohibition of murder, just as it applies within societies. The conditions of peace, set out by Maimonides in the laws of kings and their wars, include acceptance of the Noahide laws, by a nation, vanquished in war. Peace is established, to modify a phrase of J. F. Kennedy, ultimately not by pacts or deterrents, so much as by a culture of peace and common grassroots values supporting this peace in the societies constituent to the peace. These common values and belief, intrinsic to all human beings, are contained in the Noahide laws.
That the law of international order, of world society, is the concrete morality of the Noahide laws, is of interest not only from a legal point of view, but also from that of the theory of international politics. It is far from Realpolitik and notions of balance in mutual deterrence in an intrinsically lawless, anarchic world of sovereign nations. To the contrary, according to Torah, the order of the international community represents a moral imperium, arbitrated by suitably constituted and qualified courts of law. Hence, the first feature of a universal, Noahide law, which places nations “under G-d” is the continuity of national and international law. This does not remove authority from individual states (in their own administrative and fiscal arrangments) nor does it seek to merge their cultural personalities, but it subjects them to the same law of humanity: the Noahide laws.
The fact that these laws are expounded in the tradition of the Oral – or Rabbinic – law, does not imply any concept of Jewish political suzerainty (supremacy). These laws, which are part of Torah, are the law of G-d. Before the formation of the Jewish people, there were Noahide courts which arbitrated this law, and made enactments binding upon the nations in general. Since the biblical revelation at Sinai, however, these laws – as part of Torah in general – are interpreted, where new questions arise, by those properly qualified to do so.
The Noahide laws and the integrality of “public” and “private” morality
The second feature of the Noahide laws in placing all persons “under G-d” is the inseparability of the laws relating to “private” morality, i.e. between the human and G-d, and those between person and person. Most pointedly this means that personal morality, including sexual morality, becomes a concern of Government and legislation, whether in regard to what it does (commission) or fails to do (omission). This is a delicate realm, calling for sensitivity in positive action, but Government certainly may not, for example, legitimize and facilitate sexual behaviours forbidden by the Noahide laws. Irrespective of whether and to what extent Government can do something about it, before G-d there is no distinction between the private and the public, between morality and law.
The integrality of the private realm (between the person and G-d) and the public realm (between persons) is borne out from a number of perspectives. Thus, it has been explained elsewhere that the prohibition on idolatry – a commandment in the personal realm – is primary among the Noahide laws: it represents the acceptance of the “King” (G-d), upon which is predicated the acceptance of the “King’s decrees”, the remaining Noahide laws. Whilst a prohibition on blasphemy would appear closely related in the personal realm to the prohibition on idolatry, it is harder at first glance to see how laws bearing on sexual relationships have to do with one’s relation to G-d. The answer to this would seem to be that it has to do in a very basic sense with the assertion of the spiritual over the physical in a human being. A “purity of…private life”is also part of the general attunement to G-d – required by the “private” Noahide commandments – from which fulfillment of commandments in the public (interpersonal) realm obtains its authority and force. Indeed, Divine lawfulness is first authentically accepted in the personal realm.
Secondly, Divine lawfulness needs to be extended from the personal realm to the realm between persons. Even in the openly “rational” laws, such as the prohibitions of theft and murder, grey areas abound. Outright killing no one would support, but what of assisted suicide, euthanasia etc? Stealing money is prohibited, but what about forms of psychological deception and manipulation (called in Jewish law the “stealing of understanding”) practised in the market place? A legal system is one of the precepts of the Noahide laws, obviously operating in the realm between persons. But what of the technical use of the system, in such a way as to favor wealthier clients? The Noahide laws illuminate all these darker areas in the public realm, but they are extended rigorously to the public realm only by one of strong integrity in personal belief and practice – who is willing to accept Divine commands, a Divine will, rather than following the vagaries of personal reason.
It should be noted that the gentile societies which have most resiliently remained decent societies in the public realm – which have not succumbed to despotism and terror – are those which acknowledged the biblical source, if not the explicit detail of the Noahide laws themselves. These were societies which practiced what in fact was a basically unalloyed monotheism and were influenced by a tradition which is called “Hebraic”, as elaborated by Matthew Arnold in his discussion of the puritan strain in English culture, which is certainly (and more so) manifest in American culture.
American society, which (though imperfectly and contradictorally) approximates Noahide ethos more than any other nation, congressionally endorsed the Noahide laws in 1991. It is also the most religious gentile nation on earth, in terms of the professing of a belief in one G-d, upon the part of ordinary Americans. On its currency is written the words “In G-d we trust”, and the explicit moralism of American politics extends, notwithstanding certain historical “isolationist” episodes, to its relationship to the world society. Marxists, and other materialisticallyminded critics, might view the motives of Americans much more skeptically, as being driven by material interests, but then again it was Karl Marx, and those critics, who sought to remove G-d and the soul from human discourse.
The norm of humanity
When we speak of persons – whether as individual constituents of a society or as collective cultures or societies – we find a concept of humanity in Noahide theology, which relates to persons, individually and culturally, in terms of their relationship to the Sovereign of the universe, G-d. In Hebrew (biblically, the original language of humanity) the generic term for human being (which is the name of the first individual human being, Adam, or in the ashkenasi pronunciation of Hebrew, odom) is explained etymologically to be related, not simply to the word adama, the earth, from which Adam was fashioned, as the Bible relates. It is also associated with the concept of adama l’elyon,”I resemble That which is above”.
What this signifies, as the Lubavitcher Rebbe explains in relation to the Jewish people – and this can be extrapolated to the gentile – is that the “entire concept and being of the of the Jewish body is that it should be a vessel to the soul: in order that the soul should be able to fulfil the will of G-d as this is enclothed in practical commandments….”. That is to say the body is subordinated to the soul, not in an ascetic sense, but that the powers of the body are harnessed by it to Divine purposes.
In the Jewish people, the Maharal of Prague found the freeing and crystallization of the spiritual vis-à-vis the physical or material. This was a result of their special historical experience in the Exodus from Egypt and the biblical revelation at Sinai, through which they achieved their “essentially removed [nivdal] ” spirituality. This was distinct from the wholly submerged spirituality of the Egyptians, who represented the dominance of the physical, as expressed in their rife immorality; and also in the barbarous practices of the nations of Canaan, which represented the form – or essence – of materiality (or physicality) itself.
On the other hand, a person or national society in which the spiritual form has, or is returning to, clarity and preeminence (and may be called odom – resembling the Above), has to that degree realized its humanity. In the words of the Maharal of Prague, “… the G-dly image relates to the [gentile] person [odom] inasmuch as he [or she] is a person [odom] also, and this is obvious [m’vuar] “.
Moreover the concept of balance and harmony of good values in action, which defines the person [odom] extends also to the concept of the gentile sovereign, the personification of the nation. For, where a sovereign refrains from theft and (other abuses of the Noahide laws), he or she has been worthy to receive an endowment of a Divine quality of judgment to be able to manage the stability and welfare of the state in balance and harmony. This is the spiritual significance of the law in Torah that the fiscal and administrative conduct of the State is binding on all, Jew and gentile alike (dina d’malchusa dina), for the Sovereign administering this fundamental harmony is acting in imitation of the Divine.
From a Torah point of view, the essential function of a legal “person”, whether an individual or a state, is to carry out the will of G-d. In contradistinction to this, there is a concept of human autonomy in its modern sense, going back to the Renaissance and the Reformation, which defines itself also in the context of the “separation of religion and state”, and in the freedom from the imperatives of religion. The social elaboration of this doctrine of autonomy in its liberal-democratic form is that the human being can and should be an “autonomous” independent, free entity insofar (this being the formulation of later liberal theory, as in J.S. Mill in On Liberty) as this not infringe the similar liberty and the rights of others. In Noahide doctrine, the will of the human soul is understood to be the desire to imitate the Divine. Its will coalesces with a Divine norm. In this case, the Renaissance and Enlightenment concept of human autonomy, is to be understood as the freedom of the person from this spiritual side of his or her being. It is the freedom of the material-volitional dimension of the human being. And indeed, this is precisely how the biblical account of the sin of eating from the tree of knowledge explains the entrance of free will, in as much as the human physical impulse gained a power which could occlude the soul and its imperatives.
Whilst freedom of choice is a fundamental principle in Noahide theology, being free from compulsion and being able to chose, does not define the actualized essence of a human being. The essence of a human being according to Noahide concepts is not to be something other than, but rather to actualize the Divine Image, the spiritual faculty in humankind. What realizes that essence is the modeling of the Divine in man through performance of Divine commandments (mitzvos) which connect a human being with G-d. In the case of a gentile, these are the seven Noahide laws set out in Torah for all humanity. For a Jew, it is the 613 commandments set out in Torah. The greatness of a human being, however is not that he or she can chose arbitrarily, but that choice is exercised to affirm the spiritual. By “submitting” to the commandments a person does not “nullify” or abrogate his or her significance. To the contrary: a life of fulfillment of Divine imperatives – which actualizes the Divine image within humans – is their significance. Conversely, when a person is free “from” religion, he or she is in fact alienated from his essence and paradoxically this amounts to a form of enslavement.
Similarly, in the Noahide concept, the individual material personality of the person and the particular cultural personality of the society is not repressed as a result of the assertion of the spiritual. Rather, these become personal expressions or vehicles for the service of G-d. The greatness of a person or a society, consists also in the integration of its personality into the service of G-d.
The concept of the imitation of G-d is the imitation of Divine attributes, as these are expressed in the commandments as discussed elsewhere. At this point, however, it should be noted that the “Divine attributes”, are not attributes which actually inhere in G-d, for nothing could actually be said to define G-d Himself. Rather, it is explained that these attributes are the instruments or modalities which G-d chose to create, through which to act in the world. These modalities or attributes are replicated in the human soul – enabling a basic relationship and communication – “imitation” – between the person and the Divine, microcosm and macrocosm. These attributes, as they are employed by G-d, have a quality of transcendence, infinitude. G-d’s kindness is not in the measure of normal human kindness, nor is His quality of mercy or of judgment.
Nevertheless, there are different levels or ways in which the human imitation of the Divine proceeds. One is the attempt to imitate the Divine attributes in their transcendent aspect: this draws holiness (in Hebrew, k’dusha, transcendent removed G-dliness) into the order of society and nature. Another is their imitation on the immanent plane, as they pertain to the harmonious internal maintenance of society and nature. Finally, there is a level of transgression and disregard for these qualities, resulting in harm to the social-natural order, which, so to speak, removes the Divine image from – or wholly submerges it within – the persons, societies and cultures, which transgress the precepts associated with these qualities. Each of these relationships to the imitation of the Divine ways expresses itself in a different kind of agency and mission (or in the last case, counteragency) in realizing the Sovereignty of G-d in the world.
- Human agencies of the Divine
The Talmud states that everything in which a gentile has been prohibited by Torah, a Jew has also been prohibited. In addition, a Jew must also do what ever a gentile is required to do. A Jew is commanded to cleave to G-d’s attributes, through fulfillment of the six hundred and thirteen commandments and to fulfil them in a manner of transcendence. Hence, most of the mitzvos incumbent upon Jews relate to acts, which appear supererogatory – go beyond and above, what would normally be required – in relation to the normal maintenance of the world. These are mostly strikingly expressed in a multitude of commandments relating to concepts of purity and holiness, including those associated with the service of the Temple. On a practical social level, they involve acts of social kindness. An example of this is lending money without interest. Taking interest is in itself not a bad thing. It is the rental of money like the rental of any other item. By common societal standards, it could not be said to be evil and is permitted to Noahides. Nevertheless, a Jew is enjoined to lend without interest, as an extra measure of kindness, and similarly to take pains to return lost property.
In the first place these and a multitude of other supererogatory acts are required of a Jew only in relation to another Jew and in the context of the society of Jews, who are reciprocally obligated in them. However, their extension to a Noahide is permissible and also desirable especially where those societies have themselves accepted these norms (such as which have lost-property offices) so that these acts are reciprocally meaningful. Similarly, a Noahide may take upon him or herself the commandments incumbent upon Jews with the exceptions of the Jewish Sabbath and certain modes of the study of Torah.
A Jew moreover has an obligation to sustain – to provide livelihood, where necessary, for – the ger toshav, a non-Jew, who at the time when this procedure can take place, accepts before a religious court to keep the Noahide laws. There are those who state that in many respects a gentile nowadays, who accepts (even informally) the Noahide laws, has the same rule as the ger toshav. Just as the majority of the commandments given to the Jews go beyond the ordinary maintenance of the social order, so the function of their performance through Jews is to draw an additional sanctity, a transcendent holiness, into a social and world order which has already been stabilized by the nations following the Noahide laws.
Ordinary pity and kindness, as well as the measured severity required to curtail forms of anti-social behaviour are all (Divine) attributes which find concrete embodiment in Noahide law, to preserve peace (sholom) and social order (yeshuvo shel olam). The seven Noahide laws represent negative commandments incumbent upon Noahides. There is also a positive obligation upon Noahides to give charity. Indeed, the Lubavitcher Rebbe states that, beyond the seven Noahide laws there are two further categories of laws mandatory upon Noahides: (a) qualities of conduct, mandated by normal human decency (known by the spiritually informed intellect) such as the keeping of one’s word, ordinary modesty and so forth and (b) additional restrictions (and ordinances) which the nations have taken upon themselves.
The Noahide laws are generally held to be so evident and normal that one cannot plead ignorance or lack of warning to be exempt from liability for their non-observance. The theoretical punishment of the Torah for transgression of the Noahide laws is death, although such a penalty could only be enforced at a time when the great Sanhedrin, the Jewish High Court, convened in its place on the Temple Mount, and it seems that even when that was the case, this penalty was almost never carried out. The significance of the theoretical death penalty in general, whether for Jew or non-Jew, is given in the words of Rashi, namely that “one has transgressed the will of one’s Creator”. In the case of the Noahide laws, it is that the very purpose for which a human was created, namely to settle the world peacefully has been contradicted and, and so also the essential point of the human being’s existence has been vitiated.
In many places in the Talmud the terms for gentile (goy or nochri) without any further qualification (i.e. not the term which explicitly signifies “idolater”) denotes idolatrous and barbarous peoples, such as those in whose midst the Jews lived. Already, however, a major late medieval Rabbinic authority, the Me’iri, (who lived some 700 years ago) observed that most of the nations of his time in some broad sense observed the Noahide laws, following a life regulated by laws and conventions. Speaking in relation to certain penalties laid upon idolaters in relation to damages, he writes, “that for all those who follow the Noahide laws, their rule in relation to us is like our rule in relation to them and there is no favour towards ourselves. Needless to say this applies to orderly, civilized societies [b’darchei dosos v’nimusim]“. Closer to our time, the Remo, the author of the great Ashkenasi gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (the code of Jewish law) writes similarly, and this has clear halachic force. And the Nodeh B’Yehudah, a few hundred years after that, writes even more positively that the nations amongst which the Jewish people lived in his time “have basic religious belief in the creation of the world, in the prophecy of the prophets and the wonders related in the Torah and Prophets”, and so have no comparison with the status of certain earlier barbarous peoples. This does not mean that all contemporary cultures are observant of the Noahide law, or that those which in some sense broadly are, are without imperfection in many areas of their observance. Yet there are societies which in many ways are exemplary: and this opens up the vista of human perfectibility described by the Talmud, which speaks of a gentile, occupied with the study and practice of his or her commandments as being like the High Priest of the Jewish people.
The “idolater” – one who neither authentically recognizes G-d or His laws – is whether individually or a collectively (as a culture), barbaric. Within an otherwise orderly domestic context, the idolater is typified in Torah sources as the social outlaw, the strongman or gangster (such as the tax farmer who takes what he wants above and beyond the amount which the King had required), both on a domestic and international level. The Torah T’mima speaks of this category as one of individuals or societies, whose conduct disregards the intent of the Noahide laws (“maintenance of the world and society, security, life and possessions, mercy and pity upon creatures”) and moreover actively do the opposite – who kill, are sexually immoral, thieve, actively pursue forms of cruelty and so forth.
Society (both on a world and domestic level) has to deal with them as people, who, in different degrees are at war against society. How is one to relate to them? On the one hand, we find that, on the positive side, basic pity can be shown to those who are not actively at war with society. Thus Maimonides writes that a Jew is also to give charity to poor idolatrous non-Jews, to bury those of their dead, left without burial, alongside poor Jews.
On the negative side, one may not steal from them, though one may impose penalties upon them for anti-social behaviour. Thus the Mishnah (the early codification of the oral law) discusses a case where people allow their livestock to roam and cause damage. If a Jew’s livestock causes unforeseen and unpredicted damage to the idolater’s livestock, there is no penalty upon the Jew, whilst the idolater must pay full damages. Maimonides explains that in this case no obligation was placed on the Jew to pay damages to the idolater, in those circumstances where they do not do this for one another. The Jew is not depriving them of an entitlement, which they conventionally possess. He is not violating reciprocity at that basic level. However, the Torah has placed upon the idolater a penalty to pay damages, when he or she causes damages, because of “their carelessness in mitzvos and because they do not remove damaging entities”. A removal of entitlement might be an infringement (and in terms of their own expectations, there is none here), but the exaction of a penalty is not. Through the penalty, however, they are then motivated to a higher level of social responsibility. (When, however, they themselves, practice basic decency, then, in the words of the Mei’iri, quoted above, “their rule in relation to us is like our rule in relation to them and there is no favour towards ourselves”).
The concept of such a penalty is hence to rectify a behaviour. It is already foreshadowed in the conduct of Abraham, related in the Midrash who would receive wayfarers into his home and feed them. He would then ask them to thank G-d for the food. If they declined, he would present them with a high bill – shocking, but justified (not an act of theft) in terms of the difficulty of bringing provisions to his desert oasis – for the food they had consumed. This kind of action – a harsher justice for one who was ordinarily so kind – indicates that sometimes a measure of coercion is required to transform the coarseness of an individual or culture. The brazenness of the person would be “broken”, but the intent was to reorient the individual, not to visit him or her with retribution.
At the same time, and indeed before the application of this form of coercion, Abraham would, by speaking about G-d and perhaps through the example of his person and conduct, seek to awaken a recognition of G-d on the part of those around him. Indeed the most profound “coercion”, is that which individuals or cultures apply to themselves. This occurs especially when they experience a revelation of (especially a transcendent) G-dliness and respond by wanting to submit their minds and bodies as instruments of Divine purpose and themselves experience the Redem
 I am grateful to Professor Arnold Loewy and to my wife, Miriam Cowen, for their critical comments on an earlier version of this essay.
 For a discussion and comparison of positive and natural law doctrines, see S.D. Cowen, “Eternal law and human legislation: secular and Jewish perspectives”, Journal of Judaism and Civilization, vol. 1, 5758/1998, pp. 68ff.
 See Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 26, pp. 141-42, who explains that persecution for centuries, if not millennia, made dangerous the public discussion of this universal morality, set forth for humanity, in Jewish tradition.
 Rabbi S. Zevin, L’Or HaHalachah, pp.16-18.
 See Maimonides, Hilchos M’lochim, 6:1-3 in connection with the war of a Jewish king with gentile nations. It is not simply a question of submission or surrender, but a substantive subscription to the laws which make normative international society.
 As expressed in the concept of dina d’malchusa dina – the law of the land is law, also in the eyes of Torah. See below, Section 2.
 Such as the court of Shem, the son of Noah. See Talmud Avoda Zora, 36b, cited by Or HaChayim on Genesis 38:24. See also Rashi on Genesis 34:7.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 2, p. 98.
 Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 26, pp. 138-39.
 With which Grotius extolled Louis XIII, in his dedication of De jure Belli ac Pacis, Vol. 1 of the translation by F.W. Kelsey et al, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc, (reprinted 1964), p. 4.
 See Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, edited with an introduction by J. Dover Wilson, London: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
 Public Law 102-14, 102d Congress, 1st Session, H.J. Res. 104. The resolution begins with the following text:
“Whereas Congress recognizes the historical tradition of ethical values and principles which are the basis of civilized society and upon which our great Nation was founded;
Whereas these ethical values and principles have been the bedrock of society from the dawn of civilization, when they were known as the Seven Noahide Laws;
Whereas without these ethical values and principles the edifice of civilization stands in serious peril of returning to chaos…”
 See Rabbi Menachem Azariah Mipano, Asora Ma’amoros, Ma’amar “Eim Kiol Chai” 2, 53, cited in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 10, p. 103 fn. 23. The term relates to the person’s ability top resemble the Divine, but actualizing this depends on his or her own choice.
 See below, in the name of the Maharal of Prague.
 Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 10, p. 104.
 See G’vuros HaShem, chapter 4.
 In Sefer Netzach Yisroel of the Maharal (Netzach Yisroel, ch. 11, p. 74).
 Rabbi DovBer, “Bad Kodesh”, letter 27 in Igrois Koidesh – Admur Hazoken, Admur Ha’emtza’ee, Admur Hatzemach Tzedek, NY: Kehot, 1987
 Inasmuch as the Divine will is enshrined in the Divine (Noahide) laws governing humanity. In regard to seeing to it that others should keep these laws, we find an explicit instruction in Torah (Maimonides, Hilchos M’lochim 8:10) that Jews should do all they can to induce the non-Jewish world to keep the Noahide laws. When non-Jews themselves participate in disseminating knowledge and strengthening observance of the Noahide laws in the world, they are participating in the redemptive task of humanity as a whole, in conjunction with the Jewish people. The Congressional proclamation of 1991, mentioned above, can itself be seen as an act of this kind. See Kol bo’ei olam, pp. 189ff.
 See the commentary of Rashi on Genesis 2:25.
 America was first settled by a group which wanted freedom of (i.e. to be religious), rather than freedom from, religion. The concern that the state, in upholding religious (Noahide) values, could in fact be discriminating against other religious values, is at variance with the basic Noahide theological concept, that the Noahide laws in fact represent the common – essential and root-historical – spirituality of humanity.
 In the words of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, in regard to Jews: “When a Jew does not fulfil Torah and mitzvos… then, even though he looks as though he is “free” – without a yoke – and it is easier than fulfilling torah and mitzvos, this is in fact a form of unnatural servitude [avodas perach]. This is because conducting his life not according to Torah is the opposite of what his true essence and nature and demands.
This is analogous to the statement of our Sages that unnatural servitude means “(the work of men for women and) and the work of women for men”. Even though the work is an easier one for men, it is an “unnatural servitude” because it does not correspond to their habituation and nature” (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 17, p. 75).
 It has to be remembered that these are not the foundations of the commandments, which originate in the Divine will, but are rather qualities expressed in, and inculcated through, the perfromance of the commandments.. See the chapter on “Rationality and the Noahide laws”.
 See the chapter “The Noahide laws and human personality”.
 See S. D. Cowen, Jewish Thought in Context, Melbourne: Institute for Judaism and Civilization, 2001 (4th ed’n), pp. 35-36.
 See Talmud Sanhedrin, 59a.
 See here Likkutei Sichos, Vol 34, pp. 153-59 and especially fn. 56. So also Likkutei Sichos, Vol 37, pp. 72-78.
 Although this prohibition can by certain arrangements, known as a heter iska, be circumvented, the imperative of kindness as applied in interest-free loans remains wherever possible.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 12, p. 115; Pischei Chshen, Dinei Aveidoh 1:18 (with notes, including elaboration of the position of Rashi, which counters the above).
 Maimonides, Hilchos M’lochim, 10:10.
 See Encyclopedia Talmudis, Vol. 6, column 292.
 I.e. when the laws of the Jubilee year are practised (Maimonides, Hilchos Issurei Bi’a, 14:8).
 See Rabbi M. M. Schneerson, Sha’arei Halachah uMinhag (Vol 3, p. 56), which cites the Tzafnos Panei’ach that according to Maimonides (Hilchos M’lochim, 10:10), Jews are obligated to sustain also a Noahide, who accepts the seven Noahide laws, even without the formal acceptance of this in a Jewish court, made by the ger toshav. See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 26, p. 134, fn 23*, which intimates that such is the view also of the Tzemach Tzedek in Sha’alos u’T’shuvos, Yoreh Dei’ah, 83.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 39, pp. 35-6, in addition to Vol. 34, pp. 53-59, mentioned above.
 Sanhedrin 58b. Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 157.
 Based on Rabbeinu Nissan, Chiddushei HaRan on Sanhedrin 56b. The Yad Rama on Sanhedrin, 57b is also cited in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 157, fn. 54.
 See Hisvaduyos of Shavuos, 5747 in Rabbi M.M. Schneerson, Toras Menachem 5747, part 3, p. 429ff.
 See in general the chapter, “Rationality and the Noahide laws”.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 147.
 Maimonides, Hilchos M’lochim, 10:1.
 Maimonides, Hilchos Sanhedrin 14:11, and so would seem to the ruling according to the Lubavitcher Rebbe in Sha’arei Halachah uMinhog, Vol. 3, pp. 56 ff, but see Rabbi J.D. Bleich, “Capital punishment in the Noachide Code” in his Contemporary Halakhic problems, Vol 2, NY: K’tav, 1983, pp. 342-43.
 See Talmud, Sanhedrin, 10a.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 160, cited above in the chapter “Foundations of the Noahide Laws”.
 On Bava Kama, 38a.
 In Shulchon Oruch, Orach Chayim, 156..
 “His’natzlus ham’chaber”.
 Talmud Sanhedrin, 59a.
 Even though such individuals and cultures may associate their belief with “G-d”, one would have to say that that is their idolatry: that a particular interest, identity or entity is made absolute and is called “Divine”.
 See Bava Kama 113b; and Aruch HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpot 348:2: “ovdei cochovim anasim hakadmonim”.
 Torah T’mima, Sh’mos 21: 277.
 See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 160.
 See end of chapter 10 of Maimonides, Hilchos M’lochim.
 Maimonides, Hilchos G’neivah, 1:1.
 Bava Kama, 4: 3.
 Hilchos nizkei momon 8:5
 Just as a parking fine is not an act of theft.
 B’reishis Rabbo, 49:4.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 15, pp. 122-128.
 See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 23, p. 181